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DUE PROCESS
purpose would be served by undoing the adoption order and
disrupting the child's new family ties because of a technical flaw
in the surrender allocution. "9
There are constitutional issues implicit in this case involving the
fundamental liberty interest of the parent-child relationship. The
termination of parental rights is an extreme threat to one's liberty
representing the most significant of state intrusions."' Indeed,
"[a]ny procedure that affects those parental rights must guarantee
due process."m This case never reaches the stage of challenging
the constitutionality of New York's adoption statutes. Rather, it
illustrates the procedures that the law in New York has employed
to assure the protections of due process in the adoption arena.
Daxor Corporation v.
New York State Department of HealthO
(decided June 5, 1997)
Appellant, New York State Department of Health [hereinafter
"State"], terminated the respondent, Daxor Corporation's
[hereinafter "Daxor"], provisional licenses to operate certain
medical facilities. 0  Daxor commenced the instant action,
asserting that the termination was "biased, arbitrary and
capricious, " 91 and that due process, guaranteed by both the
Federal9 and New York State93 Constitutions, had been violated
6 Id. (Titone, J., concurring).
8 See In re Sarah K., 66 N.Y.2d 223, 239 n.6, 487 N.E.2d 241, 249 n.6,
496 N.Y.S.2d 384, 392 n.6 (1985).
8 id.
89 90 N.Y.2d 89, 681 N.E.2d 356, 659 N.Y.S.2d 189 (1997).
90 Id. at 95, 681 N.E.2d at 359, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 192.
91 Id.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 This section provides in pertinent part:
"No State shall ... deprive to any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." Id.
9 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This section provides in pertinent part: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." Id.
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by the State's failure to provide it with a hearing."' The Appellate
Division, First Department, held that the licenses that had
previously been granted to Daxor by the City of New York
[hereinafter "City"] were a "protected property interest" and that
the State had no right to deny the licenses without a hearing. 9
The New York State Court of Appeals, reversing the order of
the Appellate Division, First Department, held that Daxor's
provisional licenses were not protected interests and, therefore,
Daxor was not entitled to a hearing before the licenses were
terminated.16
Daxor Corporation is the owner and operator of a blood bank,
semen bank and clinical laboratories in New York City.7
Licensing of Daxor's semen banks was first required by the State
in 1991.98 Daxor's semen bank, in existence since 1971, operated
under a provisional license that was granted by the State in
1991." Daxor's blood bank and clinical laboratory were licensed
and regulated by the New York City Department of Health until
1994, when an amendment to Public Health Law § 574' ® gave the
State exclusive control of licensing for all such facilities state-
wide. 101
The State notified Daxor that in order to continue to operate
they would have to apply for state licenses."' In the interim, they
I Daxor, 90 N.Y.2d at 95, 681 N.E.2d at 359, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 192.
95 Id.
9 Id. at 99-100, 681 N.E.2d at 361-62, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 194-95.
97 d. at 93, 681 N.E.2d at 358, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 191.
" Id. at 94, 681 N.E.2d at 358, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 191.
9 Id.
100 N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 574 (McKinney 1990). This Statute provides
in pertinent part:
No person shall own or operate a clinical laboratory located
in or accepting specimens from New York state or own or
operate a blood bank which collects, processes, stores and/or
distributes, human blood, blood derivatives or blood
components, in New York state unless a valid permit has
been issued ....
Id.
o Daxor, 90 N.Y.2d at 94, 681 N.E.2d at 358, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 191.
102 id.
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were permitted to continue operating in accordance with their city
licenses pending resolution of their state license applications.' m
In 1994, the State sent Daxor a letter proposing to deny all of its
applications and to terminate its provisional licenses due to
numerous violations of the law.tm Daxor asked the State to
reconsider the denial alleging that many of the violations either no
longer existed or were minimal and of a technical nature.1"5
However, after review, the applications were denied and the
provisional licenses were terminated.16 Daxor claimed that when
the State took over the City's job, it was "'grandfathered' into
[S]tate licenses" and thus the State's denial of its licenses
amounted to a revocation which by law requires a hearing.'
The New York State Court of Appeals began its analysis by
looking at the legislative intent behind the 1994 amendment to
Public Health Law § 574, which transferred the authority to
regulate medical facilities from the City to the State.1'3 The court
found that the explicit language of the amendment and the
legislative intent behind its passage" did not automatically grant
state licenses to Daxor."0 Relying on In re Richard I, Inc. v.
Ambach, 1I the court stated that, although existing licenses require
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 95, 681 N.E.2d at 359, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 192.
106 Id.
107Id. at 96, 681 N.E.2d at 359, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 192.
103 Id.
11 See Mem. of Leg. Rep. of City of New York, Bill Jacket, reprinted in
1993 N.Y. Laws 27-28 (McKinney 1993). See also Mem. of Senator Michael
J. Tully, Jr., reprinted in 1993 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 315-16.
"
0 Daxor, 90 N.Y.2d at 96-97, 681 N.E.2d at 359-60, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 192-
93.
"1 90 A.D.2d 127, 457 N.Y.S.2d 583 (3d Dep't 1982). In Richard, the
court found, in rejecting the petitioner beauty schools' application for a license
from the State, that the application was a renewal application not the
suspension or revocation of an existing license. Id. at 130, 457 N.Y.S.2d at
585. The court stated that "[u ]nder such circumstances, a hearing [was] not
required." Id.
1998 943
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a hearing to be revoked, there was no analogous right for initial
applications or renewals."'
Daxor then claimed that its right to a hearing was based on a
property interest "derived from years of continuous operation
under the City's licensing scheme and provisional State
licenses.""' In Board of Regents v. Roth,"' the United States
Supreme Court found that an untenured professor did not have a
property interest sufficient to mandate that University authorities
afford him a hearing when they decided not to renew his
employment contract."5 In discussing the professor's due process
claim, the Supreme Court noted that the Fourteenth Amendment
safeguards interests in benefits that a person has already acquired
and that these property interests have certain attributes." 6 The
Court stated in order to have a property interest, a person "must
have more than an abstract need or desire for it" but instead must
"have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.""" Therefore, the
Supreme Court stated that the Federal Constitution does not
create property interests, rather, they are defined by "an
independent source such as state law." "'
The Daxor court stated that, in order to decide if a right has
been created by state law, "the focus is on the relevant statute,
regulation, or contract establishing eligibility for the benefit at
issue. ' " 9  The constitutionality of a state law that withheld
Medicaid reimbursement claims was challenged by the petitioner
clinical laboratories in Medicon Diagnostic Labs v. Perales,120 as
being violative of due process.'M  The New York State Court of
112 Id. at 130, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
"3 Daxor, 90 N.Y.2d at 98, 681 N.E.2d at 360, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 193.
"4 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
"
5 Id. at 578.
116 Id. at 576-77.
"7 Id. at 577.
118 Id.
"9 Daxor Corp. v. N.Y.S. Dep't of Health, 90 N.Y.2d 89, 98-99, 681
N.E.2d 356, 360-61, 659 N.Y.S.2d 189, 193-94 (1997) (quoting Medicon
Diagnostic Labs. v. Perales, 74 N.Y.2d 539, 549 N.E.2d 124, 127, 549
N.Y.S.2d 933, 936 (1989)).
"o Medicon, 74 N.Y.2d at 549 N.E.2d 124, at 549 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
121 Id. at 541-42, 549 N.E.2d at 125, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 934.
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Appeals, when making a determination of whether due process
had been violated, looked at three distinct factors that constituted
the balancing test set forth by the Supreme Court in Matthews v.
Eldridge.2 It found that due process was satisfied because there
were procedures in effect that, in effect, protected the private
interests of the petitioners while safeguarding the government's
interest in the integrity of the Medicaid program.'2 Therefore,
the Daxor court looked to Daxor's alleged property interest in
light of the state laws from which it was derived. 124
Property interests have not been found in benefits that are
contingent upon subjective factors because satisfaction of those
factors is wholly discretionary.1'2 In Doe, '' a prison inmate was
denied participation in a prison program that provided for
conjugal visits with his spouse after it was found that he had
contracted AIDS. 12 Defendant and his spouse claimed that the
State had violated their constitutional rights to due process
because in establishing the program, the State had created a
legitimate expectation of conjugal visits and that such expectation
is a constitutional interest protected by due process.'12 The New
York State Court of Appeals held that since participation in the
program was based on fifteen subjective factors, the review
12Id. at 546, 549 N.E.2d at 128, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 937 (citing Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). The Mathews balance test is as follows:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probative
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.
Id. at 321.
' Medicon, 74 N.Y.2d at 546-47, 549 N.E.2d at 127, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 937.24 Daxor, 90 N.Y.2d at 98, 681 N.E.2d at 361, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 194.
125 Doe v. Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d 48, 518 N.E.2d 536, 523 N.Y.S.2d 782
(1987).
26I d. at 55, 518 N.E.2d at 541, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
127 1 d. at 51, 518 N.E.2d at 538, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 784.
128 Id. at 54, 518 N.E.2d at 540, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
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system was highly discretionary.'29 Therefore, the couple did not
have an expectation that could be protected by due process.3°
In contrast, under a Federal Constitutional analysis, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the
town's denial of certificates of occupancy to a builder, based
solely on the fact that certain roads in the development had not
been accepted by the town, was a violation of due process."' The
Sullivan court, in an opinion written by Judge George C. Pratt,
noted that it is difficult to determine whether a license applicant
has presented a legitimate claim of entitlement under state law or
merely a one-sided expectation of some sort of benefit.' The
legitimacy of the claim "should depend on whether, absent the
alleged denial of due process, there is either a certainty or a very
strong likelihood that the application would have been granted." "3
The "theoretical possibility of discretionary action" does not
make every license application a "mere 'unilateral hope or
expectation"' that would not create a protected property
interest."34
The Daxor court found that the law gave the State broad
discretion in licensing medical facilities." 5  In order to decide
whether to issue licenses to facilities, the State had to consider
129 Id. at 55-56, 518 N.E.2d at 541, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
3 Id. In addition, the dissent contended that the couple's rights had been
violated because a prisoner regulation is only valid when it is "reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests." Id. at 68, 518 N.E.2d at 549, 523
N.Y.S.2d at 795 (Alexander, J., dissenting) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482
U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). In Doe, the court found that the prison had no
"legitimate penological purpose" for preventing the conjugal visits. Id. at 75,
518 N.E.2d at 554, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
"' Sullivan v. Town of Salem, 805 F.2d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that
the denial of a builder's application for certain housing licenses would
constitute a due process violation if the houses met the town's requirements
since there could be no element of discretion in the town's denial).
"31 Id. at 84-85.
"' Id. at 85 (quoting Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v. Johnson, 593 F. Supp. 329,
332 (D. Conn. 1984)).
134 Id.
" Daxor Corp. v. N.Y.S. Dep't of Health, 90 N.Y.2d 89, 99, 681 N.E.2d
356, 361, 659 N.Y.S.2d 189, 194 (1997).
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factors such as whether the facility was "competently staffed and
properly equipped" and "operated in the manner" required by
the Public Health Laws and whether the people who ran the
facility "possess[ed] the character, competence, training, and
ability" to administer the facility, clearly discretionary factors."m
Because Daxor's provisional licenses could be revoked at any
time and thus did not give rise to a property interest, Daxor was
not entitled to a due process hearing.3 7
It is clear from the previous cases that the federal and state law
governing the protection of property rights under due process are
coterminous. Both federal and New York State courts look at
whether the party claiming the property right has a legitimate
claim of entitlement to it under the law or contract that
established the right'38 and then decide whether the law grants
discretion to the authority granting the right.3 9 Finally, both the
state and federal courts apply a balancing test"0 in order to see
how much discretion defeats the entitlement."'
People v. Thompson" 2
(decided October 23, 1997)
Defendant appealed his conviction,"' claiming his right to due
process under the New York State Constitution'" was violated
136 Id. (quoting N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 575 (2), § 573 (2) (McKinney
1990)).
'
37 Id. at 99-100, 681 N.E.2d at 361, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 194.
138 Id. at 98, 681 N.E.2d at 361, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 193 (citing Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
139 Id. at 98-99, 681 N.E.2d at 361, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 194 (citing RRI Realty
Corp. v. Inc. Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911, 918 (2d Cir. 1989)).
1 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976).
141 Sullivan v. Town of Salem, 805 F.2d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 1986); Daror, 90
N.Y.2d at 99, 681 N.E.2d at 361, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 194.
142 90 N.Y.2d 615, 687 N.E.2d 1304, 665 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1997).
1 Id. at 618, 687 N.E.2d at 1304, 665 N.Y.S.2d at 23. Defendant was
convicted of kidnapping in the first degree, five counts of rape in the first
degree, four counts of sodomy in the first degree, assault in the second degree,
and robbery in the third degree. Id.
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